How does this explain asymmetries in duties of self-care vs duties of other care. Might be best framed by the rules of rescue stuff in the literature, along with writings about the unilateralists curse obvs. Is it better to do evil or be done evil to
One purely utilitarian reason it might be appropriate to be more risk-averse when caring for other than for yourself is that if everyone was entitled to be risk-neutral when dealing with other people’s welfare, rather than deferring to consent/respecting their autonomy, we would get the unilateralist’s curse.
Unilateralist’s curse
- The best lack all conviction, while the worst/Are full of passionate intensity.
Is there a deep connection between the unilateralists curse wrt utilitarian agents being more risk-producing and utilitarian investors being more risk-neutral/having non-diminishing marginal utility with money?
The epistemic virtue/duty versions of the unilateralist’s curse tie into Honesty and Poker
Pruss on conflicts between epistemic decision procedures and criteria of rightness
- You’ll be cloned tomorrow. After you both wake up, both you and the clone should have p = 0.5 on being the original, (criteria). But now, before the cloning, you should commit to believing you are not the clone, since you only have an agent-relative obligation to believe true things, the zero-sum nature of the accuracy across people isn’t your problem. Paradoxes of deontology, virtue, and belief
https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1111/phpe.12197
This is the same stuff as the winners curse in auctions. I.e. the true value of an item is the mean of bids, but the winner will always be above the mean.
- does this time it in with information asymmetry and adverse selection more generally?
- what algorithms exist for avoiding/correcting for the winners curse?
Is there somehow a relation between this unilateralists curse stuff and systemic change stuff, where counterfactual impact agents will disregard the option of allying to leave stable equilibria? Idk why but I feel like there’s a connection here.
Opaque insurance contracts exist to wash out the information asymmetry between buyers and the insurance firms by confusing the buyers.