Does this relate to the Unilateralists curse somehow? Does it depend on asymmetries in duties of self-care vs duties of other care. Might be best framed by the rules of rescue stuff in the literature.
Maybe its better for us to be the victim of than do evil, but should we prefer to keep those we love from being the victims of evil over keeping them from being the perpetrators of evil?
What about when either you or your partner must do evil to the other? Which should you pick?
Pruss on conflicts between epistemic decision procedures and criteria of rightness
- You’ll be cloned tomorrow. After you both wake up, both you and the clone should have p = 0.5 on being the original, (criteria). But now, before the cloning, you should commit to believing you are not the clone, since you only have an agent-relative obligation to believe true things, the zero-sum nature of the accuracy across people isn’t your problem.
- Paradoxes of deontology, virtue, and belief