Modally robust virtues = shapley values??
- Stoning people to death example is a good case of the split between causal and moral responsibility. One option is to say no one is responsible in either sense for the victims death, but everyone is responsible for making it the case that even if some people backed out the others would still kill her were participiation to drop to the criticial threshold. Or for it being the case that were others to drop out oneself would becone responsible. In other words participation in crimes like that makes your own (and others) moral status (of not being a murderer) less robust, in this way it makes you less virtuous and more incontinent? But dont you want to say it makes you vicious, not incontinent? Might have to tweak something. (Bazargan-Forward NBN)
Virtues are attractors in idealisation-space? Agents bidding for idealisation/realisation? Virtues are bridges of responsibility-passing (i.e. identity preserving bridges) through the steps of idealisation? How do these connect with shapley values though? Whats the isomorphism?
- It’s important to note the difference between ideal states defined by intrinsic properties, or defined as the output of a function. The first is like criteria of rightness, the second is like definition via picking the right decision procedure
Sub agents and the individuation of virtues: if the relevant sub agents are considered as something like chunks of your utility function/intrinsic values that can/should be rationally revised (possibly together with the more general dispositions to act/feel/etc. that are instrumentally rationally required by having those virtues). This would mean the relevant subagents are the proto/benevolence sub-agent, proto-courage sub agent, etc. This would seem to cut across the notion of having sub agents qua social roles, since moral virtues by their generality apply across social roles/contexts.
Are the factions bidding for the global workspace theory at all like character traits? Could virtues bid in a virtuous human like that?
Can the question of the unity of virtue be practically relevant?
Unity of virtues stuff depends on how reasons cluster into equivalence(?) Classes within which all possible actions(?) Are ordered transitively/closed under transitivity(?) And/or symmetrically. I.e. nothing 8s neother better nor worse than other options.
This should match with how public choice theory bundles people, such that non pareto optimal outcomes are neither better nor worse nor as good as other non-pareto optimal ones?
So then this framing of the unity of virtue should mirror all the consequemces of can you make interpersonal comparisons in economics but on the scale of an individual.
I womder if this will throw any light on the classical motivations for caring about the problem?
Claude: Novel implications:
- Could we quantify “moral character” by looking at Shapley-like values across modal space?
- Does this help formalize the difference between virtue and continence? (Continent person might have good Shapley values in actual world but poor ones across modal space)
- Could this connect to your later note about virtues as attractors in idealization-space?