Compare references in notes and the args of moral saints to Kagan’s the limits of morality. Motivation is the influence LOM has had on certain people. So this is about the demandingness of morality, what a good life is, etc.
I wonder if that RYC? solution to the demandingness of morality/ where does drowning pond logic end that says it’s about making reasonable sacrifices or whatever would struggle in cases where you work a demanding but well paid altruistic job. The point is are you already compensated for the sacrifice of the work by the salary (or prestige, or interestingness or w/e). You could say you have make reasonable sacrifices that you wouldn’t make but for their moral worth (almost a Kantian good will notion there). But that still might not get you out of the fun but demanding job satisfying, BC what if you’re benevolent, so you would only work an altruistic job, and if your job wasn’t doing good (i.e. doing the job was ethically good or obligatory or w/e (clarify axiological vs deontic here)) you wouldn’t do that particular job. But yeah somehow this gets at the kinda Kantian notion of the good will vs alternative solutions to that problem (moral motivation? Idk what problem it solves) and stuff through the weird backdoor of talking about the limits of morality and hw drowning pond logic relates to the good life. But yeah, lso personally relevant ofc.ike I walk home from my fun demanding job and do I need to volunteer at the homeless shelter too? Oh it’s also like the question of whether billionaires who donate 90% of their wealth are praiseworthy vs. are they fulfilling their moral obligations or w/E. But yeah what compensates for sacrifices is probably a pretty general problem for these attractive seeming theories about the limits of various obligations. Probably Kagan talks about this in the limits of morality.